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Export cable
Concept Definition
Interconnector
Meshed grid
Hybrid project
Dual-purpose cable 
Transmission cable which connects an offshore wind farm 
to a (transmission grid) connection point. Traditionally, the 
connection is established between the power plant and the 
corresponding national onshore transmission grid, thus building 
a radial connection.  
Transmission cable which crosses or spans a border between 
Member States and which connects the national transmission 
systems of the Member States.
In a meshed offshore grid, offshore wind farms are connected to 
more than one national transmission system. A characteristic 
of this grid architecture is the dual-purpose use of sea cables, 
which can serve alternately or simultaneously as interconnectors 
and export cables, and the possible routing of power from a given 
offshore wind farm to two or more national grids.
Any offshore wind project which is not connected radially 
to the shore, or any offshore cable which does not solely act 
as an interconnector; that is, any project in which cables act 
simultaneously or alternately as interconnectors or export 
cables. The multiplication of hybrid projects in the Baltic Sea 
is expected to ultimately lead to the emergence of a meshed 
offshore grid.
Transmission cable which can alternatively or simultaneously act 
as interconnector or export cable.
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EE            Estonia
EEZ         Exclusive Economic Zone
EIA     Environmental impact assessment
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LCOE            Levelised cost of energy
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PCI      Project of Common Interest
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VSummary
Research conducted within the Interreg Baltic InteGrid project is intended to facilitate 
the establishment of a meshed offshore grid connecting offshore wind farms (OWFs) 
and national electricity markets in the Baltic Sea. To this end, the project partners have 
prepared three sets of recommendations for EU and national level stakeholders. This 
report elaborates on the partners’ recommendations for the policy and regulatory fields, 
which are as follows:
Provide an adequate regulatory framework for investments 
in OWFs and grid projects:
1. Provide a harmonised method for the allocation of connection costs by: 
-  opting for a harmonised super-shallow cost allocation method for OWF connections 
in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR) to fully support the integration of offshore wind energy 
(OWE);
-  connecting development areas for OWE with grid development plans; and
-  organising a task force among all relevant stakeholders for future planning, for example 
within the Baltic Offshore Grid Forum, in order to limit cost overruns in network 
expansion and reinforcement. 
2. Ensure an adequate institutional framework for OWE investments by:
-  determining OWE expansion targets at national level;
-   actively involving public authorities in the selection of suitable offshore wind production 
sites; and
-  applying targeted institutional frameworks for the installation and operation of OWFs  
that provide reliable remuneration for project developers at selected locations.
3. Give transmission system operators (TSOs) coherent incentives to invest and operate 
meshed offshore grids by:
-  adopting an incentive package for TSOs that promotes innovation; mitigates investment 
risks associated with meshed grid project development while limiting overall spending 
at TSO level; and couples TSO profit with the expected benefits of a meshed grid; 
- achieving convergence across the regulatory regimes in the BSR to send harmonised 
signals to TSOs regarding investment incentives and performance; and
- forming a cooperation framework between relevant regulators and TSOs to implement 
a meshed offshore grid regulatory package that involves the transparent, reliable and 
unambiguous sharing of good practices. 
4. Provide an investment framework for multilateral grid projects by:
- providing suitable regulatory conditions for multilateral grid investment projects, 
allocating cross-border network development expenses between the involved TSOs 
using an adapted methodology that accounts for the distribution of the expected benefits 
VI
and losses across countries; and
- reaching a high degree of cooperation between TSOs and the relevant authorities in 
defining and implementing jointly agreed cost allocation methods.
Provide an adequate legal framework for the construction 
and operation of a meshed offshore grid:
5. Ensure the legal feasibility of hybrid projects by:
- not making OWF permits conditional on feeding energy into the national transmission 
grid; and
- providing specific definitions and provisions for dual-purpose cables and meshed 
offshore grid infrastructures at the EU level.
6. Avoid distortions in connection location among offshore wind developers by:
- harmonising the signals sent by grid access tariffs in the BSR, where such tariffs reflect 
the usage cost incurred by the offshore wind operators, as set out in the EU Inter-TSO 
compensation mechanism regulation; and
- avoiding capacity-based fees.
7. Set rules for the operation of a meshed offshore grid by: 
- establishing clear meshed grid operation rules at EU level;
- providing clear capacity allocation rules for OWFs connected through dual-purpose 
cables and ensure their access to the grid; and
- creating an overarching regulatory authority for a meshed offshore grid at EU or regional 
level and encouraging TSO cooperation.
Ensure environmental protection and increase public acceptance:
8. Balance project developers’ interests and environmental protection by:
- Performing strategic environmental assessments (SEAs) as accurately and 
comprehensively as possible to shift the main assessment of environmental hazards at 
an earlier planning stage; and
- conducting a single environmental impact assessment (EIA) whose results can be 
reused at every successive procedural stage when several permits are needed for an 
OWF or grid project.
9. Increase public acceptance for offshore wind projects by:
- encouraging public participation as early as possible in grid and maritime planning 
processes; and
- providing flexible schemes and mechanisms to involve local communities in projects.
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1. Introduction
1.1  Objectives
These recommendations, prepared by the Interreg Baltic InteGrid project partners, propose 
policy and regulatory adjustments at EU and national levels with the goal of eliminating 
existing obstacles to the development of a meshed offshore grid for OWE in the Baltic 
Sea. The recommendations are based on the findings from the Baltic InteGrid project,1 
in particular the reports “Establishing an offshore meshed grid – Policy and regulatory aspects 
and barriers in the Baltic Sea Region” (July 2018) and “Economic considerations on the regulatory 
framework for offshore wind and offshore meshed grid investments” (October 2018).2 These 
recommendations are intended to assist public authorities, such as the EU Commission, 
national and regional governments, municipalities, and regulatory authorities (e.g. ACER); 
as well as stakeholders, such as ENTSO-E, national TSOs, and offshore wind operators.
1.2  Methodology
This deliverable is the continuation of previous publications within the Baltic InteGrid 
project. First, the project partners compiled inventories of policies and regulations 
relevant to transmission grids and offshore wind generation in all eight EU Member States 
located around the Baltic Sea. The partners then identified policy and regulatory barriers 
to the realisation of a meshed offshore grid in the Baltic Sea. Those barriers include: 
-  a lack of adequate incentives to invest in offshore wind technology; 
-  challenges associated with public acceptance of wind energy; 
-  insufficient (onshore) grid capacity to accommodate offshore electricity production; 
-  the use of obsolete cost information as a basis for offshore wind development, regardless 
of significant decreases in costs of OWE;3
-  a lack of political will to develop the sector, as indicated by the failure to establish specific 
offshore wind targets in most EU BSR countries; 
- constantly changing support schemes for electricity from renewable sources (RES-E); and 
- complex administrative procedures required as part of the permitting process for grid 
and generation projects.  
1.3 Meshed offshore grid rationale
In 2018, as much as 70% of Europe’s offshore wind capacity was installed in the North 
Sea; only 12% of the continent’s total installed capacity was located in the Baltic Sea.4 
Nevertheless, offshore wind development in the BSR has great potential due to the area’s 
suitable wind conditions, shallow waters, short distances to shore, and low tides. Offshore 
wind energy development is expected to increase and accelerate in the BSR between now 
and 2050. Assuming moderate to high build out of offshore wind energy, a meshed offshore 
grid is the most efficient way to connect wind farms and countries in the BSR.5 A meshed 
offshore grid would require a transition from the traditional grid architecture of radial 
OWF connections and separate, single interconnector cables to a regionally interconnected 
offshore grid. This grid architecture is characterised by the dual-purpose use of sea cables, 
which allows cables to serve alternatively and/or simultaneously as interconnectors and 
export cables, and by the possible route of electricity from a given OWF to two or more 
national grids and market zones (figure 1).
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A meshed offshore grid can be achieved by implementing hybrid projects. These may 
be defined as any offshore wind project that is not connected radially to the shore, or 
as any offshore cable that does not act exclusively as an interconnector. An example of 
such a project is one that involves two OWFs, each located within a different country’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), each connected to that country with an export cable, and 
both linked to each other by an interconnector. This solution is found in the Kriegers Flak 
Combined Grid Solution, a link currently under construction that will connect the Danish 
and German OWFs Kriegers Flak and Baltic 2 in 2019 (figure 2).6 For the development of 
a meshed grid, it is necessary to ensure that these hybrid projects are not only legally 
feasible, but also properly incentivised.
EEZ A
EEZ C
EEZ B
A
B C
Export ﬂow Interconnector ﬂowInter-array cable
Figure 1. Architecture of a meshed offshore grid. | Source: IKEM (2019)
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The benefits of a meshed offshore grid are numerous. The dual use of connection cables, 
accommodating flows from OWFs as well as interconnection flows, permits a higher 
utilisation rate of the grid infrastructure. Some interconnectors in the EU are not being 
used at full capacity.7 As of 2016, the BalticCable, for example, was not using 39% of its 
technical capacity; Estlink 1 used only 76%.8 An optimal use of available infrastructure 
is an important benefit of the meshed grid approach and allows for cost savings in grid 
infrastructure, as less subsea cables are needed to transmit the same amount of electricity. 
Fewer subsea cables also mean that less maritime space is required, reducing the potential 
for conflict with other sea uses (e.g. fisheries) and minimising environmental impact. 
Another advantage lies in the numerous transmission routes for OWE to reach the onshore 
grid, which facilitates a higher system integration of electricity from renewable energy 
sources and offers greater resilience to OWF operators. Project partners also identified 
further benefits; for example, cost-sharing opportunities between investors in OWFs and 
TSOs reduce overall system costs while increasing system flexibility and cross-border 
energy trade. One final advantage specific to the BSR is the greater integration of the Baltic 
States into the EU energy system, which helps to end their energy isolation. 
Despite these benefits, the development of a meshed offshore grid in the Baltic Sea faces 
several challenges, such as a high initial investment (even when offset by long-term 
efficiency savings) and the use of sophisticated new technologies. There are also significant 
challenges related to the policy and regulatory sphere, such as complicated regulatory 
frameworks that are not adapted to meshed infrastructure. These recommendations will 
outline key challenges and propose improvements and solutions.
Figure 2. Example of a hybrid project: interconnection through OWFs (Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution). 
| Source: IKEM (2019)
An optimal use of available 
infrastructure is an important 
benefit of the meshed grid 
approach and allows for cost 
savings in grid infrastructure, 
as less subsea cables are 
needed to transmit the same 
amount of electricity.
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2. Barriers and solutions for a meshed offshore grid 
in the Baltic Sea
Essential to the realisation of a meshed offshore grid in the Baltic Sea is the creation of a 
coherent policy and regulatory framework to address identified barriers. Recommendations 
addressed to stakeholders at EU and national levels were developed to address these issues 
and can be divided into three main categories: recommendations to achieve an adequate 
regulatory framework for investments in OWFs and grid projects (2.1), recommendations 
to achieve an adequate legal framework for the construction and operation of a meshed 
offshore grid (2.2), and recommendations to ensure environmental protection and 
increase public acceptance (2.3).
2.1 Provide an adequate regulatory framework for 
investments in OWFs and grid projects
It is necessary to provide an adequate regulatory framework for investments in OWFs. A 
clear, harmonised allocation of connection costs for OWFs in the Baltic Sea is required 
so that project developers can choose the best location for their projects regardless of 
connection costs. Adequate remuneration schemes are necessary. Investments in meshed 
offshore grid infrastructures must also be incentivised. For example, incentive packages 
for TSOs should be offered to promote innovation and mitigate investment risks associated 
with meshed grid project development. In addition, adapted methodologies should be 
developed to allocate cross-border network development expenses in meshed offshore 
grids between the involved TSOs.
2.1.1 Provide a harmonised method for allocating 
connection costs
One way to create a level playing field is to harmonise the distribution of connection 
costs between TSOs and OWF operators in the Baltic Sea. Ideally, the construction of 
offshore grid infrastructure and the connection of OWFs should pose little to no risk to 
offshore wind operators. Simplicity in cost distribution methodology, particularly in the 
Incentive packages for 
TSOs should be offered to 
promote innovation and 
mitigate investment risks 
associated with meshed 
grid project development.
Issue:
The diversity of grid connection cost allocation methods (figure 3) that apply in the 
Baltic Sea Region may severely undermine the completion of meshed offshore grid 
projects. Grid connection approaches reflect how the costs associated with network 
expansion and reinforcement to connect an offshore wind farm should be split 
between the offshore wind operator and the TSO and are set at the national level. 
Discrepancies result in different financial and regulatory risks borne by the involved 
stakeholders and in distortions perceived by the market actors on where to locate 
their park, possibly at the expense of the best location in terms of wind conditions. 
The different conditions for connection create an uneven playing field among offshore 
wind farm operators in sending different signals that will ultimately reflect on their 
bidding strategy and profitability.
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case of multiple stakeholders, should be prioritised to limit potential delays or disputes 
during the development phase. It is recommended to use a super-shallow cost-allocation 
approach (figure 3), whereby the offshore wind operator bears the connection costs only 
up to the point of connection with the offshore grid.
In the super-shallow approach, the TSO is responsible for the overall expansion of the 
grid infrastructure and for the potential reinforcement of the existing onshore grid, which 
is made necessary by the increase of power flows associated with the new offshore wind 
generation. A super-shallow approach is currently used in Denmark for tendered OWF 
projects, for instance in the Kriegers Flak project (although this approach is currently 
under discussion). It is also part of the new German legal framework for the tendering of 
offshore wind capacity in the EEZ. 
On the downside, a super-shallow approach can mask locational signals: since the 
offshore wind developer does not need to consider the connection costs in choosing a 
location, cost overruns in building new lines may occur. Accordingly, a balance should 
be found between appropriate siting of the OWFs and least-cost grid development in 
order to avoid uncontrolled network expenses. One way to address this is to create 
a regional task force involving the energy regulatory authorities, maritime spatial 
planners, TSOs, and representatives of the wind energy sector in the relevant countries 
of the BSR. This task force could draw up a series of scenarios and roadmaps to possible 
meshed offshore grid planning, taking care to reflect the different stakeholders’ 
constraints and aiming to maximise the overall efficiency at the meshed grid level. The 
task force could be institutionalised either at EU level or via multilateral agreements 
between the involved countries. 
A balance should be found 
between appropriate siting 
of the OWFs and least-
cost grid development in 
order to avoid uncontrolled 
network expenses.
LT
PL
DE DK
DK *
EE LV SE
FI
Super-shallow
Shallow
Deep
LEGEND
Near-shore and 
open-door projects
Tendered, far-shore
projects
Grid connection 
point
*
**
**
Figure 3. Cost-allocation approaches. | Source: IKEM (2018)9
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Recommendation: 
-  Opt for a harmonised, super-shallow cost allocation method for OWF connections 
in the BSR to fully support the integration of OWE; 
- Connect development areas for OWE with grid development plans and organise 
a task force among all relevant stakeholders for future planning, e.g. within the 
Baltic Offshore Grid Forum, to limit cost overruns in network expansion and 
reinforcement.
The Renewable Energy 
Directive 2009/28/EC sets 
minimal binding targets 
for the share of energy 
from renewable sources 
within the Member States’ 
gross final consumption of 
energy in 2020. 
2.1.2 Ensure an adequate institutional framework for OWE 
investments 
Due to the specific requirements of OWE and the complexity of building a meshed offshore 
grid, public authorities should be involved in the process of selecting and developing 
suitable production sites. Public authorities are involved, for example, when areas for 
potential offshore wind development are identified in maritime spatial plans (MSPs) or 
selected for tendering, while investors subsequently compete for the construction and 
operation of OWFs at the chosen locations. Such frameworks tend to limit the amount 
of stranded investments and allow for harnessing synergies from integrated generation 
and grid planning. The contracts for investors who implement OWE projects should 
include a targeted allocation of risks (such as quantity and cost risks) to create incentives 
for efficient investment-related and operational decisions. To avoid cost increases, the 
revenue of generators who are awarded contracts should not be highly dependent on 
uncertain market developments. 
Sliding market premiums, for example, are recommended remuneration schemes 
because, in principle, they offer a high potential for limiting costs. These should be 
technology-specific due to the substantial differences between available technologies, 
which make it more reasonable to carry out a targeted procurement based on 
individually adapted institutional frameworks. Because some degree of consistency and 
predictability in regulatory action is an elementary component of investment-friendly 
institutional frameworks, care should be taken to avoid the problems associated with 
sudden paradigm shifts.
Issue:
The costs of OWE generation projects highly depend on the institutional framework 
for the construction and operation of wind farms, which determines the possibilities 
for investors to generate revenues. The ‘energy-only market’ approach, in which 
investment decisions are decentralised, cannot be regarded as a suitable concept 
for investments, as investors face high market risks that translate into substantial 
increases in the cost of capital. Furthermore, such decentralised investment decisions, 
including in the selection of production sites, impede an efficient coordination of 
generation and grid planning. 
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In countries with significant OWE capacity, tenders are suitable instruments for selecting 
generators and determining remuneration levels. This approach is currently used in the 
Danish offshore wind tendering scheme and in the “central model” that will soon be 
applied in Germany in accordance with a recent reform. Furthermore, tendering allows 
public authorities to control the generation capacity installed in their sovereign waters. 
It is a suitable instrument for the implementation of specific OWE targets, which should 
be adopted by the central governments or regions of Member States to encourage the 
expansion of OWE capacity in the Baltic Sea.
In the case of innovative projects and countries entering the offshore wind market for 
the first time, incentives such as remuneration schemes should minimise the perceived 
risk to investors and compensate for the additional risk associated with the novelty of the 
project. This would allow the technology to compete with other energy sources that receive 
subsidies, primarily fossil fuels and nuclear. Once an emerging market reaches maturity, a 
transition towards a competition-based payment system is recommended, provided that 
enough visibility is given to investors so that they are aware of upcoming changes when 
they make their investment decisions. 
With the costs for offshore wind development rapidly decreasing, it is likely that, in the 
medium term, offshore wind can be developed competitively without subsidies. However, 
the decision to abandon remuneration for OWE in the future must be considered carefully, 
as cost and income will vary from project to project.
2.1.3 Give TSOs coherent incentives to invest in and operate 
meshed offshore grids 
Recommendations:
- Determine OWE expansion targets at national level;
- Actively involve public authorities in the selection of suitable of offshore wind 
production sites; and
- Apply targeted institutional frameworks for the installation and operation of OWFs 
that provide reliable remuneration payments for project developers at selected 
locations, possibly via tendering.
Tendering allows for the 
selection of generators, 
the determination of 
remuneration levels, and 
it gives public authorities 
control over the generation 
capacity installed in their 
sovereign waters.
Issue:
The expenses associated with the TSOs’ activities to develop and operate their 
systems are ultimately paid by the final consumers through grid tariffs. The 
extent to which TSOs can recover these costs, and the methods allowed for doing 
so, is strictly regulated at national level; regulatory agencies decide on a series 
of incentive instruments and objectives for TSOs’ cost recovery and determine 
how they can perform their duties. The countries around the Baltic Sea have very 
diverse regulatory regimes for TSO cost recovery. This diversity presents the TSOs 
with multiple incentives for investment and operation. Ultimately, the lack of 
harmonisation in the incentive instruments creates uneven financial risks among 
the TSOs that would jointly invest in meshed offshore grid projects.
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The regulatory regime is implemented by regulators and aims to ensure that the TSOs 
perform their duties in an efficient way. For that, regulators use a series of incentive 
instruments and mechanisms associated with the different capital and operation 
expenditures. For example, investments could be incentivised by eliminating the financial 
risk associated to a given spending through authorising a complete pass-through of the 
expense in the tariff. An instrument could also grant a premium to complete certain project 
deemed strategic or risky or else reward improved quality performance. Regulatory bodies 
can play a critical role in promoting meshed grid projects by creating a set of incentive 
instruments and mechanisms that drive investment choices towards a meshed offshore 
grid solution rather than traditional radial connections and interconnections. 
A supportive regulatory regime should build on the features of meshed offshore grids as 
an investment. A meshed grid is deemed innovative, capital-intensive, with the potential 
for unlocking large efficiency gains and socio-economic benefits, and requiring strong 
cross-border coordination. Adapted incentive instruments should support R&D activities 
and guarantee that the total cost of building the meshed offshore grid is passed through 
in the tariffs and remunerated with a rate of return that captures the risk of investing in 
such a project. A regulatory regime for cost recovery should at least facilitate innovation, 
limit the financial risks of meshed offshore grid development, couple the TSO’s profit to 
expected benefits, and limit overall TSO spending. 
The implementation of such a framework presupposes a distinction between expenses 
incurred to complete meshed offshore grid projects and the remaining expenses incurred 
by the TSOs in their respective territories. The inherent investment risk associated with 
hybrid projects should receive a different treatment than the controllable expenses for 
which cost uncertainty is low. The novelty of meshed offshore grids and their transnational 
nature increases the risk of cost overruns, including from inaccurate cost estimates or 
delayed implementation due to coordination difficulties. It is critical that all involved 
TSOs receive coherent regulatory signals when developing these projects. A portfolio of 
performance-based indicators is generally used to evaluate the quality of the TSOs. To 
stimulate investment, profit-making could be coupled to the expected benefits of a meshed 
offshore grid through the development of dedicated performance indicators. The scope 
of performance-based instruments (e.g. financial rewards and fines) in meshed offshore 
grids is limited, however, due to multiple factors. These include the non-monetised 
nature of some benefits and the inability to assess their impact at a national level alone, 
which prevents them from being captured in a national-based performance indicator. 
Performance indicators are based on the non-harmonised set of available performance 
data across countries, which adds another level of complexity. Cross-border coordination 
– e.g. in pooling key regulatory competences, sharing expertise, and deciding jointly on 
best-suited incentive instruments – would bring coherence to the regulatory regimes in 
the BSR and mitigate differences in regulators’ resources.
Regulators should create 
incentive instruments 
that drive investment 
choices towards a meshed 
offshore grid solution 
rather than traditional 
radial connections and 
interconnections.
Cross-border coordination 
would bring coherence 
to the regulatory regimes 
in the BSR and mitigate 
differences in regulators’ 
resources.
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Recommendations:
- Adopt an incentive package for TSOs to promote innovation; mitigate investment 
risks associated with meshed grid project development while limiting overall 
spending at the TSO level; and couple TSO profits to the expected benefits of a 
meshed grid;
- Achieve convergence across the regulatory regimes in the BSR so that signals 
sent to the involved TSOs are harmonised in terms of investment incentives and 
performance;
- Implement a cooperation framework among the involved regulators and TSOs to 
implement a meshed offshore grid regulatory package that includes the transparent, 
reliable, and unambiguous sharing of good practices.
2.1.4 Provide an investment framework for multilateral grid 
projects 
The lack of strong cooperation between national authorities and between TSOs is a 
critical risk factor in the completion of meshed offshore grids. Transnational electricity 
infrastructures are currently limited to interconnectors that connect two national 
transmission systems — and TSOs — under bilateral agreements, which generally 
stipulate cost-sharing on a 50/50 basis. Meshed offshore grids expand the scope of such 
agreements to include more stakeholders - including additional TSOs - , who are likely to 
benefit from the new infrastructure as well. 
In an investment framework where the withdrawal or the non-cooperation of an actor can 
jeopardise the project, new cross-border cost-allocation methodologies must be jointly 
discussed and agreed upon. These methodologies should be able to capture the array of 
benefits generated by meshed offshore grids, in terms of both their monetised value 
(effects on market prices due to increased interconnection and better integration of low-
cost energy, reduced congestions, etc.) and non-monetised value (increased security of 
supply, faster transition to a low-carbon energy system). Accordingly, a suitable cross-
border cost-allocation framework should also consider welfare losses potentially incurred 
by countries as a result of the project. A fair allocation of costs and benefits would therefore 
limit the interference of national interests in regional welfare without overriding national 
sovereignty and give the green light to multilateral projects.
Issue: 
Another issue lies in the cost distribution dilemma between TSOs involved in a 
multilateral grid project. It is necessary to implement an investment framework 
for such projects that apportions each stakeholder’s participation according to the 
benefits expected from the project. The interlinkage between electricity infrastructure 
development and the pursuit of national interest by policymakers is strong and may 
affect cross-border infrastructure plans and investment cooperation at the expense 
of benefits and welfare in the BSR.
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The Cross-Border Cost Allocation (CBCA) method used in EU Projects of Common Interest 
(PCIs) can be used as a guideline, because it captures multilateral investment constraints 
and accounts for some non-monetised benefits. However, due to the fact that each TSO 
performs its own CBCA calculations, a simple generalisation of the CBCA tool is not sufficient 
to fully address multilateral investment challenges. Rather, it requires a dedicated legal 
framework based on suitable cooperation structures which will be implemented at EU 
level, or at least at regional level in the BSR. The efficiency of this tool will depend on the 
capability of institutions to develop the required structures and frameworks, as well as on 
the level of cooperation between the TSOs, the national regulatory bodies, and all relevant 
stakeholders in defining cost-sharing methodologies and sharing knowledge. While the 
framework for such effort should be drafted at the supranational level, what is needed is 
the political will for stronger cooperation and the alignment of different national policy 
pathways towards a common EU/regional vision.
2.2 Provide an adequate legal framework for the 
construction and operation of a meshed offshore grid 
Another goal of these project recommendations is to incite policymakers to provide an 
adequate legal framework for the construction and operation of a meshed offshore grid. 
The legal feasibility of hybrid projects must not be hindered by permit requirements that 
presuppose a radial connection to the national onshore grid. The signal sent by grid access 
tariffs in the meshed grid should be harmonised. Finally, once the meshed offshore grid is 
built, its operation must be adequately regulated under a framework that contains specific 
definitions and provisions for the specific meshed grid infrastructure.
2.2.1 Ensure the legal feasibility of hybrid projects
Recommendations:
- Cross-border network development expenses in meshed offshore grids should be 
allocated between the involved TSOs using an adapted methodology in a fair, cost-
efficient, and transparent way, taking into consideration the distribution of the 
expected benefits and losses across countries;
- Reach a high degree of cooperation between TSOs and the relevant public authorities 
in defining and implementing jointly agreed cost-allocation methods (e.g. through 
a task force created at EU or regional level).
Issue: 
The realisation of a hybrid project (e.g. an OWF connected to an interconnector) can 
be challenging from a legal perspective. EU and national legal frameworks for grid 
connections are designed based on a radial architecture. There is currently no definition 
or mention of dual-purpose cables in the relevant provisions of EU law. National 
legal frameworks may also hinder hybrid projects. In Germany, for example, the 2017 
Offshore Wind Energy Act states that an OWF can only obtain a construction permit in 
the EEZ if it has previously won a tendering procedure, which presupposes that it will 
feed its electricity into the national grid. This, in turn, presupposes a radial connection. 
Such requirements may deter developers from investing in hybrid projects.
What is needed is the 
political will for stronger 
cooperation and the 
alignment of different 
national policy pathways 
towards a common EU/
regional vision.
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To make hybrid projects legally feasible, Member States should not make permits for OWFs 
conditional on the farms’ feed-in into the national grid and thus their radial connection to 
the national transmission grid. Investors should be able to develop offshore wind projects 
independently of national grid-connection requirements. This may require consenting 
and planning procedures to deviate from the procedures for the classical configuration. 
The EU should also introduce specific provisions for dual-purpose cables. Precise legal 
definitions are needed as well as provisions setting rules for the ownership and operation 
of dual-purpose cables. These definitions will help reduce some of the uncertainty around 
hybrid projects and signal to Member States that hybrid projects can be encouraged by 
ensuring their legal feasibility.
2.2.2 Harmonise the signals sent by grid access tariffs in the  
 meshed grid
In connecting to the grid, each user, consumer, or producer generates a cost to the grid 
operator in the form of investments to build and maintain the network or costs of energy 
transmission on the lines, e.g. due to energy losses or ancillary services. Grid tariffs cover 
these costs. Because most of these network expenses are due to building the infrastructure 
and are sunk fixed costs (i.e. they cannot be directly allocated to a specific grid user), 
the costs are shared among users based on criteria that generally reflect energy policy 
objectives, such as the promotion of equity among consumers or use of renewable energy. 
Precise legal definitions are 
needed as well as provisions 
setting rules for the 
ownership and operation of 
dual-purpose cables.
Recommendations:
- The permit for an OWF should not be conditional on its being connected radially to 
the national transmission grid;
- Specific definitions and provisions for dual-purpose cables and meshed offshore 
grids should be set at the EU level.
Issue: 
Grid tariffs for OWF access to the transmission grid are set at national level. 
Because tariff designs vary among BSR countries different signals are sent to the 
OWF operators willing to connect to the same infrastructure. Currently, only OWE 
generators connected to (most of the) Danish, Finnish, and Swedish grids must 
pay a grid access tariff, and each of these countries applies a different tariff design. 
In the other countries around the Baltic Sea, offshore wind is exempted to pay an 
access fee. The question of convergence in grid access tariffs in the EU is considered 
a secondary issue at this time but is expected to become increasingly important 
with the completion of the internal energy market and the energy transition.10 In 
the context of offshore wind, different tariff designs impact the business case for 
generators and may affect their choice of location based on which TSO offers the 
most advantageous conditions for grid use. This is likely to result in the selection of 
locations with suboptimal wind conditions. The multitude of existing grid tariffs in 
a meshed offshore grid therefore creates distortions among developers and uneven 
business opportunities on the same infrastructure. 
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An appropriate distribution between fixed and variable cost components in the tariff 
encourages efficient dispatch and congestion management and sends signals to the TSO 
that guide future investments. In an international constellation such as a meshed offshore 
grid, the imposition of different tariffs on the same category of actor sends different 
signals to that actor. A 100% energy-based tariff charges a fixed fee for each unit of energy 
that is fed into the grid and results in the internalisation of the tariff in the producer’s 
bidding strategy on the wholesale market since the tariff ultimately adds on the energy 
cost per unit. On the other hand, a 100% capacity-based tariff applies a fixed fee based 
on the installed capacity. This tariff design is less favourable for production units with 
low running hours such as wind turbines as it has a greater impact on the levelised cost of 
energy (LCOE) of the intermittent unit, potentially jeopardising investments. 
An initiative to improve tariff convergence in the EU was introduced in the Inter-TSO 
Compensation Regulation.11 The Regulation sets a cap on the energy component at a level 
that approximates the real value of the variable costs; however, its scope is limited due 
to exemptions granted to some countries, including Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. 
Recommendations on tariff design are challenging, however, because such design is tightly 
linked to the legal definition of the infrastructure (i.e. interconnection, transmission grid, 
or dual-purpose), which dictates the applicable rules for grid access. If the connection 
point is considered part of the transmission grid, the grid tariff should be set among 
the involved TSOs in a way that sends appropriate economic signals and creates a level 
playing field, at least in the BSR or at the internal market level.12 Like the distribution 
of connection costs, locational signals should be minimised to support locational choices 
based on wind conditions. 
2.2.3 Set rules for the operation of a meshed offshore grid 
Issue: 
The current grid-operation rules are not suitable for the constellation of a meshed 
offshore grid due to the dual-purpose use of its transmission cables and its multilateral 
implications. The EU’s strict unbundling rules can lead to uncertainties regarding 
who may operate dual-purpose cables, which are not legally defined. Furthermore, 
non-discrimination rules and third-party access to interconnectors conflict with the 
guaranteed access of OWFs to the transmission grid. Finally, the operation of parts of 
the meshed grid by the respective national TSOs can lead the operation of the entire 
meshed grid to lack overall coordination.
Like the distribution 
of connection costs, 
locational signals should 
be minimised to support 
locational choices based on 
wind conditions.Recommendations:
- Harmonise the signal sent by the grid access tariff in the BSR through a coherent 
tariff design rather than a single access tariff that would be disconnected from the 
TSO’s physical asset costs;
- Design the tariff to reflect the utilisation cost (variable costs) incurred by the 
generators (including the offshore wind operators) and avoid capacity-based fees.
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The configuration in which a cable is used at the same time as an interconnector and an export 
cable is not considered in EU legal provisions. This can be an issue, as the simultaneous or 
even alternative use of a cable could lead to conflicts regarding which actor may operate 
the cable and in what way. Existing rules on construction, maintenance, and financing, 
for example, are designed in view of a single use only. This single use also defines which 
stakeholder may operate the cable under a strict application of unbundling rules. The EU 
should introduce specific provisions for dual-purpose cables to clarify the allocation of such 
tasks.
A lower system integration of OWE may arise from the connection to a dual-purpose cable. 
The cable’s limited transmission capacity must accommodate both the cross-border flows 
and the electricity produced by OWFs. This may result in curtailment in cases where the 
cable cannot fully accommodate both flows. In this respect, the operator’s claim to grid 
access conflicts with the rules of non-discriminatory access to interconnector capacity. To 
optimise the system integration of OWE, it is necessary to allocate clear priorities between 
the OWE and interconnection flows. Depending on the chosen solution, EU legal provisions 
on the non-discriminatory allocation of interconnector flows may need to be amended. 
Implicit auctions, which rely on the day-ahead transmission capacity, would be one way to 
allocate interconnector capacity while accounting for the needs of an OWF. 
Finally, an efficient operation of a meshed offshore grid involving more than two countries 
calls for a coordination of the respective TSOs’ tasks at an interregional level. The 
overarching surveillance and operation of a meshed offshore grid could be the task of an 
authority at the EU or regional level, such as a Regional Operation Centre, Regional Security 
Centre, regulatory agency, or even a single regional TSO operating the whole meshed offshore 
grid. The creation of an operational body acting at a regional scale could be the springboard 
for the development of operation rules that are coherent and surpass national interests. 
Moreover, the role played by the individual TSOs is crucial, and coordination between grid 
operators must be encouraged. 
2.3 Ensure environmental protection and increase 
 public acceptance
It is crucial to guarantee environmental protection and increase public acceptance of 
offshore wind and grid development in order to ensure community receptivity, as strong 
opposition from the public can ultimately lead to project failure. Project developers’ 
interests and environmental protection should be adequately balanced, for example by 
performing the main assessment of possible environmental hazards associated with a 
meshed offshore grid at an earlier planning stage and ensuring that reliable environmental 
procedures are included in project planning. Flexible schemes and mechanisms to involve 
local communities in offshore wind projects can also encourage public acceptance.
The creation of an 
operational body acting 
at a regional scale could 
be the springboard for the 
development of operation 
rules that are coherent and 
surpass national interests.
Project developers’ 
interests and 
environmental protection 
should be adequately 
balanced.
Recommendations:
- Provide clear meshed grid operation rules at EU level;
- Provide clear capacity-allocation rules for OWFs connected through dual-purpose 
cables and ensure their access to the grid;
- Create an overarching regulatory authority for a meshed offshore grid at EU or 
regional level in the BSR and encourage TSO cooperation.
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2.3.1 Balance project developers’ interests and    
 environmental protection 
One way to ensure an optimal balance between environmental conservation and ambitious 
OWE development is to make fair use of environmental law. To provide for a transparent and 
non-discriminatory assessment of the potential environmental impacts of offshore wind 
generation in a maritime environment, it is necessary to assess this issue comprehensively 
as early as the abstract planning phase. When SEAs are conducted during the drawing-up 
of MSPs where certain areas are reserved for offshore wind production, they should assess 
these potential impacts as accurately and comprehensively as possible. These results 
can then be reused at a later stage during project EIAs. One advantage of this method is 
that it can provide project developers with greater certainty regarding the environmental 
feasibility of their projects.
Offshore wind developers must also be aware of environmental constraints, and 
environmental law should be used by public authorities in a transparent and adequate 
manner while performing EIAs. Because public authorities have more discretion in applying 
the precautionary principle, risk analysis methods should be as transparent as possible for 
the offshore wind developers. The threshold above which a hazard is considered “sufficiently 
probable” to stop a project should be set with transparent criteria allowing for an ambitious 
level of nature protection and which can be easily assessed by a higher administrative 
authority or administrative court. 
Regarding the design of permitting procedures for OWE and grid projects, it is necessary 
to reduce the number of permits needed, with a single authority assessing all the needed 
permits and criteria as part of one single administrative procedure that delivers a single 
permit (“concentration effect”) – as is the case for OWF projects in Germany. The 
generalisation of one-stop shops, as required under Art. 16 of the recast Renewable Energy 
Directive,13 meaning that a project developer only has contact with one contact point 
throughout the procedure, is already a step in the right direction. In addition to lowering 
the administrative burden on project developers, a single permit with a concentration 
effect would be advantageous because it would require only one EIA per project. In 
A single authority assessing 
all the needed permits 
and criteria as part of 
one single administrative 
procedure is recommended 
for efficient meshed 
offshore grid development.
Issue: 
The environmental impact of a spatial plan to dedicate a given area to offshore 
wind production or of a concrete construction project must be evaluated in an SEA. 
These assessments may incorporate two basic principles of environmental law that 
may lead a plan or project to fail: the precautionary principle and the prevention 
principle. The precautionary principle is based on the theoretical possibility that 
environmental damage could result from the project (“abstract hazard”), whereas 
the prevention principle applies only when there is sufficient probability that damage 
will occur (“concrete hazard”). This distinction is embedded in the environmental 
law of several countries in the BSR, such as Estonia and Germany. Because there is 
considerable uncertainty regarding the environmental impact of OWE production, 
and because the technology is relatively new, strict application of the precautionary 
principle can lead to the failure of many projects and may compromise the energy 
transition. Furthermore, in countries where numerous authorisation permits are 
required, several EIAs may be conducted and produce different results; this, in turn, 
may increase the level of uncertainty for investors.
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countries where several permits would still be needed for one project (e.g. a permit to use 
the sea bed or a construction permit) an alternative solution would be to carry out one 
single comprehensive EIA, which results can be reused at further stages of the procedure, 
once all the parameters of the project are known (e.g. turbine model, pattern, or number 
of turbines). 
2.3.2 Increase public acceptance for offshore wind projects
To encourage public support and positive attitudes, early involvement of the public is 
vital. Public participation should be encouraged as early as the pre-planning stage for the 
locations of potential future offshore and near-coastal wind farms (e.g. during the SEA for 
an MSP). 
Furthermore, the regulatory framework should provide incentives for the public that are 
sufficient to increase acceptance. When planning for offshore wind projects in near-coastal 
areas or at distances where wind turbines are visible from land, the project developer 
and competent authorities can accommodate public opposition by providing schemes or 
mechanisms which provide certain benefits to the community. This framework should 
be flexible enough to account for the variety of stakeholders involved in or affected by 
a project, as their objections – and therefore possible incentives – may be very diverse. 
Stakeholders’ needs may include involvement, information, or, ultimately, financial 
compensation. 
Such mechanisms may consist of co-ownership schemes, such as those in which a larger 
group of citizens each acquire a minor share in a wind energy project, thus allowing 
citizens as a group to make large investments. A feature of the Danish Renewable Energy 
Act is the obligation to offer local citizens a minimum of 20% ownership of a wind energy 
Early involvement of the 
public is vital to encourage 
public support and positive 
attitudes.
Recommendations:
- SEAs should be as accurate and comprehensive as possible to shift the main 
assessment of environmental hazards to an earlier stage;
- EIAs should be performed in a transparent and fair manner to provide offshore 
wind investors with the greatest possible security;
- One comprehensive EIA per offshore wind project should be carried out once all the 
parameters of the project are known.
Issue: 
The lack of public acceptance is a potential barrier to the realisation of offshore 
wind and grid projects, as EU law, and thus the law of the Member States, requires 
entities, especially environmental associations, to have legal recourse to challenge 
project permits. Legal action by third parties can lead to delays in planning (as has 
been the case with the Estonian Tuulepark) and even to the eventual failure of OWFs 
or grid construction projects. A lack of public acceptance is more likely to concern 
near-shore projects. Although public acceptance can be increased by involving the 
public early in the planning phases of a project, public participation in environmental 
assessments does not always ensure a satisfactory balance of interests or guarantee 
public support in the affected communities or sectors.
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project. Project developers must invite members of the local community to participate 
financially in the project and become co-owners. The mechanism, which applies to all 
new near-shore projects, is based on the assumption that financial involvement can 
have a positive effect on local attitudes. The buying option is exercised through a tender 
procedure conducted by the developer. The shares are only offered to citizens owning 
dwellings in a municipality that has a coastline within 16 km from the location of the 
nearest wind turbine. Community benefits may also encourage local acceptance. They 
provide an immediate advantage to the local community and compensate for the local 
impacts of the project. This can be illustrated by the response to citizen opposition in 
the Smalininkai project in Lithuania: part of the income from the electricity produced 
is reinvested in improving the town infrastructure. Such measures may provide a stable 
source of revenue for the local community during the lifetime of the wind project and may 
thereby increase acceptance.
A more controversial mechanism can be used for near-shore projects. Owners located 
in the vicinity of an OWF are offered potential compensation for loss of property value. 
The effectiveness of this compensation in increasing public acceptance is subject to 
discussion, as it can signal an acknowledgement that OWFs are “a nuisance” and thus 
augment negative public perceptions. Furthermore, studies concerning the loss in value of 
dwellings located in the vicinity of OWFs have led to contradictory results.14
Community benefits 
may also encourage local 
acceptance, by providing 
an immediate advantage 
to the local population. 
Recommendations:
- Encourage public participation as early as possible, namely at the maritime spatial 
planning stage;
- Provide flexible schemes and mechanisms to involve local communities in offshore 
wind projects.
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3. Conclusion
The EU has been at the forefront of climate policy and renewable energy development, 
pledging to reduce emissions by 80%–95% by 2050 while further interconnecting 
electricity markets. A meshed offshore grid could make an important contribution to 
tomorrow’s sustainable, integrated energy landscape. For the BSR, this grid configuration 
has the potential to optimise infrastructure investments, utilise cable infrastructure more 
efficiently, connect national electricity markets, reduce the risk of curtailment, and boost 
system stability. 
While a meshed offshore grid has many benefits, it is also characterised by a highly complex 
multilateral and capital-intensive nature. The current development of hybrid projects 
reflects the willingness of stakeholders to pave the way for a meshed and efficient energy 
system in the EU. The declining costs of OWE and advancements in grid technology are 
positive market signals for innovative solutions. From the North Sea Wind Power Hub to 
the Kriegers Flak Combined Grid Solution, investors and stakeholders are demonstrating 
that the market is ready for new, visionary concepts related to OWE distribution and 
transnational planning. It is crucial that this interest translates into a forward-looking 
policy framework and enhanced cooperation between Member States and stakeholders at 
the regional level. 
These recommendations aim to assist in developing an adequate policy and regulatory 
framework that can deliver the full benefits of a meshed offshore grid and ambitious wind 
electricity production in the BSR. To tap into the long-term socio-economic benefits of a 
meshed offshore grid, upfront or short-term incentives must be provided to reduce the 
complexity and risks confronting investors. Such incentives must be designed as part 
of a holistic policy and regulatory framework that can unlock the full potential of both a 
meshed offshore grid and ambitious offshore wind electricity production. The development 
of such a framework requires a strong commitment from policymakers and regulators to 
look beyond national interests. EU institutions now have a critical role to play in laying the 
groundwork for a stable and harmonised institutional framework for the operation of an 
interregional meshed offshore grid in the Baltic Sea.
With 2.2 GW of installed capacity and rising, the offshore wind market in the Baltic Sea 
is on the cusp of accelerated development, and the grid infrastructure that will connect 
this additional capacity is not yet planned. The time is right for the EU to continue its 
leadership of the energy transition by spearheading bold policymaking initiatives and 
green innovation in offshore wind grid infrastructure. 
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